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BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION OF 1962
FRANK R. KENNEDY *
If two instances can establish a tradition, Congress in 1962 ex-
ercised its traditional function of making a decennial review and re-
vision of the Bankruptcy Act. The last such revision occurred, of
course, in 1952.1 There was no comparable enactment in 1942, but
Congress had other overriding concerns in that year, and besides only
four years bad lapsed since the overhaul of the Bankruptcy Act in
1938. World War II intervened to preclude the running of a decennium
from the Chandler Act of 1938. However, this interval which included
the war years had not been insignificant in so far as bankruptcy ad-
ministration was concerned. On the contrary, this period of relatively
few bankruptcies dramatized so effectively the deficiencies of the fee
system for compensating referees and financing the operations of their
offices that the Referees' Salary Act of 1946 was a Congressional neces-
sity.2 Then there was the furor created by the discovery that the bona
fide purchaser test incorporated in section 60 by the Chandler Act could
be used by trustees in bankruptcy to subvert commercially important
forms of chattel security, and so the next important item of bank-
ruptcy business for Congress was to deal with the demand for
revision of the preference section of the act.' So it is not surprising that
4` A.B. 1935, Southwest Missouri State College; LL.B. 1939, Washington University;
J.S.D. 1953, Yale University; Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Member of the
National Bankruptcy Conference; Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
I 66 Stat. 420 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). The legislative
history and explanation are found in H.R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952),
and Sen. Rep. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). See also Duberstein, Highlights of
Bankruptcy Amendments (1952), 27 Ref. J. 21 (1953); Montgomery, Chapter XI and
Recent Amendments, 27 Ref. J. 18 (1953),
2 60 Stat. 323 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). The legislative
history and background are set out in H.R. Rep. No. 1037, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
The House and Senate debates are reprinted in 20 Ref. J. at 48 & 105 (1946).
a The response to this demand is the elaborate amendment of section 60 and related
sections by 64 Stat. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96, 110 (1958). See H.R. Rep. No, 1293, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), for an exposition of the legislative purpose.
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noncontroversial recommendations for change in the act were allowed
to accumulate in an Omnibus Bill which did not go through until 1952.
The Omnibus Bill of 1952, as enacted, contained fifty-six sections
and about one hundred amendments, including several important sub-
stantive improvements. 4
 By contrast the Omnibus Bill of 1962 5 contains
only sixteen sections, and the significance of the changes does not
appear from this vantage point to be in any way comparable. The
impetus for the decennial revision of the Bankruptcy Act comes largely
from the National Bankruptcy Conference, a voluntary association of
lawyers, referees, law teachers and others interested in improvement
of bankruptcy law and practice. This group has "taken an active
part in the work connected with the enactment of the Chandler Act
in 1938, the revision by the Supreme Court in 1939 of the general
orders and official forms in bankruptcy, the Referees Salary Act
in 1946, and numerous other proposals directed at improving bank-
ruptcy law and its administration.'" The final versions of the acts
of 1952 and 1962 incorporate substantially the recommendations
submitted by the Conference for Congressional consideration. 7
The modesty of the provisions adopted in 1962 is hardly due
to a conviction in the National Bankruptcy Conference—or elsewhere,
for that matter—that the Bankruptcy Act enjoys a completed or per-
fected status. On the contrary, the Conference has strongly supported
recommendations for amendments which it believes to be of far greater
consequence and urgency for the good of bankruptcy administration
than those incorporated in the Omnibus Bill. In fact the Conference,
after considerable deliberation, withdrew a number of proposals from
the bill as originally drafted to avoid anticipated controversy which
might have jeopardized the enactment of the remainder of the
measures. Proposals affecting a half dozen sections of the act and a
section of the United States Criminal Code were put aside for this
reason. Another group of withdrawn proposals, affecting sections 18,
68, 133 and 136, were submitted to the Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States in
anticipation of the enactment of H.R. 7405, 8
 which would have en-
4 See note 1 supra. Several of the changes included in the 1952 law were put forward
and discussed in Moore & Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or
Retrogression?, 57 Yale L.J. 683, 707-23 (1948).
5 Pub. L. No. 87-681, 76 Stat, 570, enacted Sept. 25, 1962.
6 H.R. Rep. No. 1208, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 n.1 (1961). Among the organizations
participating in the conference are the American Bankers Association, the American Bar
Association, the American Institute of Accountants, the Commercial Law League of
America, the National Association of Credit Management, the National Association of
Referees in Bankruptcy, and the New York Credit and Financial Management Associa-
tion.
7 See H.R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952); Sen. Rep. No. 1954, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
s Note 18 infra.
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larged the Supreme Court's rule-making authority in respect to practice
and procedure under the act. One of the amendments originally in-
cluded in the bill, that of section 229c, which was intended to achieve
closer correlation with section 222, was ultimately deleted.° Four sub-
sequent additions were made—one at the instance of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and two at the instance of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States. The Commission persuaded the National
Bankruptcy Conference to add its proposed amendment of section 160
to the bill. The amendments of sections 21d and 48c were inserted at
the suggestion of the Judicial Conference's Bankruptcy Committee."
The sixteen amendments effected by Public Law 87-681 include
five proposals affecting Chapters X and XI, which originated with the
SEC. The Commission proposals had originally been introduced into
the 85th Congress in four separate bills, along with three other Com-
mission-sponsored bills proposing amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.
The Judicial Conference approved the proposed amendments of sec-
tion 265, expressed no opinion on the proposal for amending section
393, and gave qualified approval of the proposals affecting sections 160
and 247. 11 None of the bills was reported out of committee, but the
proposals to amend sections 247, 265 and 393 were approved by the
National Bankruptcy Conference at its meeting in. 1959 for incorpora-
tion into its Omnibus Bill.
One other bankruptcy measure was enacted by the 87th Congress.
Public Law 677 provides for compensation of retired referees recalled
to active duty.' Occasions for such recall arise when there is a vacancy,
art excessive workload or incapacity affecting a particular office." The
law heretofore allowed no payment to a recalled referee beyond his
retirement annuity, which he received in any event." The compensation
made available by the new legislation is the same salary authorized to
the referee serving the territory in which the recalled referee is as-
signed. If the recall is on a part-time basis, and the retired referee is
recalled for full-time service, his salary will be fixed at the minimum
rate established by the Judicial Conference of the United States for
full-time service."
D After the House Committee on the Judiciary had published a committee print of
the proposed amendments with explanatory comment in the summer of 1960, the Omnibus
Bill was introduced as H.R. 5393 on March 9, 1961.
I () See H.R. Rep, No. 1208, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1961).
11 Ann. Rep, of Procdgs. of Jud. Conf. of United States 26-27 (1958).
12 76 Stat. .559, enacted Sept, 19, 1962, amending § 40d of the act. The statutory
reference here and elsewhere in this article is to the familiar numbering of the sections
of the Bankruptcy Act as enacted rather than to the numbering in Title 11 of the United
States code.
13 H.R. Rep. No. 1940, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1962).
14 Ibid. See also Ann. Rep, of Procdgs. of Jud. Conf. of United States 21 (1960).
35 Annuities allowable for the period of employment of the retired referee are de-
ductible from the salary in accordance with the Civil Service Retirement Act,
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The two bills enacted by Congress were a minor fraction of those
on the subject of bankruptcy introduced during its two sessions. No
doubt it is a good thing for the country that most of these bills were
not enacted. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that widely supported
bills to amend the provisions dealing with statutory liens," the priority
and dischargeability of tax claims in bankruptcy," and the bill to
conform rule-making in bankruptcy to the comparable process in most
other areas of federal procedure's failed of enactment. In so technical
and complex a field as bankruptcy, it is fairly easy for a persistent
objector to delay and thwart proposed legislation by raising issues and
arguments not necessarily related to what is good for bankruptcy
administration."
The improvement of bankruptcy administration is not the only
18
 H.R. 1961, which passed the House in August 1961, was approved by the Senate
Judiciary Committee on March 8, 1962. On September 26, 1962, however, it was re-
ferred to the Senate Finance Committee from which it never emerged. The purposes
of the bill are explained in H.R. Rep. No. 708, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), and Sen.
Rep. No. 1273, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). The predecessor of this bill, H.R. 7242, had
the endorsement of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference, the American Bar Association, the American Bankers Association
and numerous other organizations. The predecessor bill was passed by both houses of
the 86th Congress, but the President withheld his approval until after adjournment,
thereby administering a pocket veto. H.R. 7242 included a provision overruling Constance
v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955). This pro-
vision was deleted from H.R. 1961 by virtue of the overruling decision of Lewis v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961). The Court's opinion in Lewis (id.'at
608) quoted from H.R. Rep. No. 745, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958), which was the
legislative report accompanying and explaining H.R. 7242. Quotations from the report
and from the President's message of disapproval rebut the suggestion that the Court
overruled a presidential veto, but the Court's use of the legislative materials is none-
theless interesting. See Comment, 2 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 372, 379-80 (1961); 15
Sw. L.J. 420 (1961); 36 Ref. J. 118 (1962). The Supreme Court has more recently
eliminated another of the problems that would have been dealt with by this bill, namely,
the conflict among the circuits respecting the validity in bankruptcy of a lien securing
a tax penalty. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962). The Treasury Department
has announced its willingness not to exploit the mischievous potentialities of another court
of appeals decision which would have been overruled by the bill, In re Quaker City
Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nom. Delsea Corp. v.
Flickstein, 352 U.S. 1030 (1957). See Sen. Rep. No. 1272, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1962).
The exercise of administrative restraint is commendable, but it is no substitute for a
legislative solution of the difficulties that beset efforts to make a rational application of
section 67c.
17 H.R. 4473, which passed the House on August 7, 1961, was approved by the
Senate Judiciary Committee on March 8, 1962. The purpose of the bill is set out in
H.R. Rep. No. 537, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). Like H.R. 1961, referred to in note 16
supra, H.R. 4473 was buried with the Senate Finance Committee on September 26, 1962.
A predecessor bill, H.R. 2236, passed the House on August 25, 1959, during the 86th
Congress. Efforts of the American Bar Association and National Bankruptcy Conference
to cut down the priority and nondischargeahility of tax claims have a long history. See
Moore & Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?,
57 Yale L.J. 683, 699-705 (1948); MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 102 (1956).
18 H.R. 7405 passed the House on August 7, 1961.
10 Cf. House Hearings on H.R. 272 and H.R. 2691, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 57-61 (1949).
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desideratum for Congress to have in mind when it considers proposals
to amend the Bankruptcy Act. In any event, the continuing effort
to attain the traditional objective of equitable distribution of insolvent
estates, which is the historical raison d'être for any bankruptcy system,
encounters considerable resistance today, especially from spokesmen
for one creditor whose interests are almost always adverse to those
of the general creditors.'
The burden of proof is, in any event, on the proponent of legisla-
tive change, and not all difficulties that arise under a statute are
amenable to solution by amendment. Many matters are best left to
the wisdom of courts. A disposition to correct every objectionable de-
cision by legislation and to tie the courts down closely in the area of
bankruptcy has had its apparent justification in a series of Supreme
Court rulings which for years frustrated Congressional efforts to deal
effectively with secret preferences." This performance is to be con-
trasted with such recent Supreme Court decisions as Corn Exch. Bank
v. Klauder," Nathanson v. NLRB," Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l
Bank" and Simonson v. Granquist." In all these cases the Court found
a pervasive purpose or principle reaching beyond the literal words of
the most pertinent provision of the act. Bankruptcy legislation, like
other legislation, should often articulate principles in language which
permits the courts some leeway in assessing the significance of multi-
tudinous facts which can never be fully anticipated and adequately
dealt with by statute.
A summary of the purpose and effect of the amendments wrought
by the Omnibus Bill follows." The text of the amended portions of the
act is set forth in an appendix following this article.
Section 2. Two correlated amendments affect section 2, which
creates and defines the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Section
2a(1), though couched in terms of jurisdiction, nevertheless defines
proper venue for bankruptcy proceedings." Prior to the 1962 amend-
20
 Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, 21 (1952).
21
 See 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 878.83 (14th rev. ed. 1950).
22 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
28 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
24 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
25
 369 U.S. 38 (1962).
26
 The summary draws mainly on the explanations submitted by the National
Bankruptcy Conference and the Securities and Exchange Commission. See H.R. 1208,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; Sen. Rep. No. 1954, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Reference
hereinafter will be only to the House Report, the Senate Report being practically
identical.
27 1 Collier, Bankruptcy Ii 2.14 (14th rev. ed, 1962) ; MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 38
(1956) ; Seligson & King, jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 Ref. J. 36 (1962).
It has been said, but without citation of authority, that a bankruptcy court would have
jurisdiction of a petition filed by or against an alien or a nonresident of this country
only if the filing was in one of the districts specified in section 2a(1). Note, 35 N.C,L.
Rev. 476, 478 (1957). If so, the bankruptcy court has no power to transfer such a case
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ment, this provision of the act included three relative clauses: The
first dealt with venue for persons having a principal place of business,
residence or domicile within a district of the United States; the second
dealt with persons having none of these contacts within the United
States but having property within the territory of a district; and the
third dealt with persons adjudged bankrupt by a court outside the
United States but having property within one of its districts. The third
clause added nothing when the person adjudged bankrupt in a foreign
jurisdiction had no principal place of business, domicile or residence in
this country." When the person so adjudged did have one of these
contacts, the clause nevertheless arguably made the location of prop-
erty within a district the only test of proper venue; or, in the alterna-
tive, it might be said to afford a basis for choosing as venue any district
where the debtor had property or any of the three other possibilities
mentioned in the first clause. The amendment deletes the third clause.
The availability of a number of choices of venue is perhaps ordinarily
not a matter requiring legislative restriction, particularly when there
is adequate provision for transferring cases brought in an inconvenient
forum. Notwithstanding the liberality of the language of the transfer
provision and the hospitable construction accorded it, it seems defen-
sible to eliminate from the act the option of allowing a bankrupt
having a principal place of business, residence or domicile in the
United States (or his creditors) to institute proceedings in any other
district where he has property."
The second amendment of section 2 adds a provision to make
clear that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is not compulsory
where a foreign bankruptcy is pending against the debtor." The
pursuant to section 32 from a district not so specified—a conclusion to be eschewed, if
possible.
28
 Since both the second and third clauses required the debtor to have property
in the district selected for venue, the latter provided no additional choice. The clause
did evidence a recognition by Congress that adjudication of bankruptcy outside the
country was no bar to the initiation of a proceeding by or against the debtor in this
country. Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Hari/.
L. Rev. 1025, 1039 (1946). As pointed out infra, the 1962 legislation deals more forth-
rightly with the effect of a foreign adjudication on the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court.
The third clause did serve to found proper venue in In re Neidecker, 82 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1936), for a partnership which had been adjudged bankrupt in France and which
had property in the Southern District of New York. The firm had also established its
principal place of business in that district shortly before the petition was filed in this
country, but the first clause of section 2a(1), as it then read, could be invoked only if
the alleged bankrupt had established his contact with the district for more than half
of the six-month period preceding bankruptcy. However, since the amendment of section
2a(1) in 1938, whatever district has been the debtor's principal place of business, resi-
dence or domicile for a longer part of the preceding six months than any other district
is a proper choice of venue under the first clause.
29 The fact of foreign adjudication creates no special need for an additional venue
option.
38 There is authority for regarding the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction compulsory,
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premise of this new provision is that it may be most consistent with
justice and fairness to permit a foreign bankruptcy proceeding to
administer an estate in its entirety, including property located in this
country."
The obverse is that it will often be fair and just for a bankruptcy
proceeding initiated under the legislation of this country to administer
completely an estate which includes property located abroad. The title
conferred on the trustee of a bankrupt by section 70a includes the
bankrupt's property wherever located. If this title is to be respected
outside this country, it is incumbent on Congress to make it possible
for the courts of the United States to give full faith and credit to the
title of a liquidator appointed by a foreign court.'
absent such a statutory provision. See 1 Remington, Bankruptcy ¶ 38 (5th ed. 1950).
But see Moore, Debtors' and Creditors' Rights: Cases and Materials 392-93 (1955).
31 This new provision carries out a recommendation of Professor Nadelmann:
It would be advantageous from every viewpoint if the bankruptcy court had
the power to refuse the local adjudication and to stay proceedings when bank-
ruptcy has been declared abroad at the domicile of the debtor and it appears
equitable and convenient that the local estate be liquidated in the foreign pro-
ceeding. As the bankruptcy jurisdiction over non-residents is maintained, local
interests remain fully protected, On the other hand, when given discretion, the
courts are in a position to reduce unnecessary duplication of proceedings to a
minimum.
The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Iiarv. L. Rev. 1025, 1044
(1946).
The Omnibus Act of 1952 made changes in sections 65d and 70a which were
recommended by Professor Nadelmann in the same article. See id. at 1031-32 & 1050-51;
Nadelmann, Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the American Bankruptcy Act, 1 Int'l
& Comp. L.Q. (4th ser.) 484 (1952), 27.Ref. J. 53 (1953).
32 Cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 545(2) (1934): "A court will order the trans-
fer of local assets to a foreign receiver, who applies for the transfer if it deems such
transfer conducive to the convenient settling of the estate." I am indebted to Professor
Nadelmann for calling my attention to this reference.
The new provision, section 2a(22), purports to apply only when the foreign
adjudication of bankruptcy is by "a court of competent jurisdiction." There is thus room
for argument as to whether a foreign order or determination affecting a particular debtor
adjudged him bankrupt and whether the tribunal entering the order or making the deter-
mination was a court of competent jurisdiction. Whether the foreign or American law
(or some general international body of law) shall provide the standards for determining
these matters is not indicated. These questions could and did arise, however, under the
venue provision deleted from section 2a(1). Thus, the court in In re Neidecker, cited
supra note 28, held that a "jugement declaratif de faillite" entered by the Tribunal of
Commerce of the Department of the Seine, sitting in Paris, France, constituted an
adjudication of bankruptcy by a court of competent jurisdiction without the United
States. The judgment of the French court had been entered ex parte without notice to
the bankrupts, but the judgment had thereafter been published in newspapers and posted
in the bankrupts' place of business, and the French law afforded them opportunity to
object to the proceedings. A "court of competent jurisdiction," according to Circuit Judge
Swan's opinion,. was one "having jurisdiction according to the laws of any civilized
country." In answer to objections based on the lack of any requirement in French law
that an involuntary bankrupt have committed an act of bankruptcy, the lack of any
provision for discharge, and the grant of power to the French court to adjudicate on
its motion under certain circumstances, the court said further:
Undoubtedly the foreign proceeding must bear enough similarity to our own to
be called an adjudication in bankruptcy, but it need not be based upon pro-
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The 1962 amendment imposes no obligation on the courts of the
United States to yield jurisdiction to a foreign court of bankruptcy
or to surrender property to a foreign liquidator. Discretion is vested
in the American bankruptcy court by the amendment to "exercise,
withhold, or suspend the exercise of jurisdiction," temporarily or in-
definitely, in the light of all the relevant circumstances, including the
rights and convenience of local creditors. Local administration may be
necessary to accomplish avoidance of preferential transfers or to en-
able local creditors to attain equality with foreign creditors.
Hopefully the lawmakers of other countries will be encouraged
to follow the example of the United States in providing a basis for
the exercise of judicial discretion in respect to the question whether a
second administration of a bankrupt estate located in two or more
jurisdictions should be undertaken. Ideally, assumption of concurrent
jurisdiction will then depend on the outcome of an inquiry into whether
it will contribute to efficient administration and the desideratum of
achieving equality in the handling of the bankrupt's estate as a whole.
Section 21d. Section 21, which is concerned with evidence, con-
tains five subdivisions dealing with certification of copies of orders
and papers emanating from or filed in bankruptcy proceedings. Sub-
division d makes certified copies "of proceedings before a referee, or
of papers, when issued by the clerk or referee," admissible as evidence
in United States district courts with the same effect as certified copies
of records of such courts. The necessity of certification by the referee
or the clerk of the district court imposes a heavy and needless burden
on these officials," and the amendment of subdivision d enables the
referee to designate an employee in his office to issue certified copies
with the same effect as those issued by himself or the clerk. The desig-
nation must be by an order filed in the office of the clerk."a
cedure identical with our own. Any judgment is sufficient by which the
debtor's property is seized in accordance with the laws of a civilized country
for distribution among his creditors.
The question that arises under section 2a(22) is, of course, different from that pre-
sented under 2a(1) as it formerly read. The court emphasized in the Neidecker case that
the question was not whether the French judgment was enforceable in the United States
but whether a condition on which depended the exercise of jurisdiction by the American
court was satisfied. 82 F.2d at 265. H the American court concludes pursuant to the
new provision that it should withhold or suspend jurisdiction to avoid unnecessary and
wasteful duplication of administration of the estate of a bankrupt adjudicated abroad,
the foreign adjudication is accorded considerably more significance than that contemplated
by former section 2a(1). Nonetheless, it does not seem likely that the interpretative
difficulties posed by the last clause of the new subdivision will be critical, since it is well
nigh inconceivable that, in any case of doubt as to whether the clause applies, the Ameri-
can court would choose to withhold jurisdiction.
38 H.R. Rep. No. 1208, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961), pointing out that the burden
has recently been increased by the 1959 amendment of section 39a of the act to require
a referee to retain all papers in a pending bankruptcy proceeding until the case is closed.
The referee's office thus gets many more requests for certified copies than formerly.
33a Editor Whitehurst of the Referees' Journal reports the view of the Administra-
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Although the amendment does not clearly make a designated em-
ployee's certification effective for the purposes specified in subdivisions
e, f, g and h, it may be noted that only subdivision d heretofore limited
the issuance of certified copies to the clerk or referee. If an employee's
certification suffices for evidentiary purposes in the United States
district courts, it ought to be adequate for the other purposes particu-
larized in section 21.
Section 48c. This section, which prescribes the compensation for
trustees under the act, had contained a clause apparently excusing the
payment of the filing fee for the trustee "when a fee is not required
from a voluntary bankrupt." Similar clauses in section 40, providing
for the compensation of referees, and section 52, prescribing the com-
pensation for clerks, were deleted in 1946 when the act was amended
to authorize the Supreme Court to promulgate a general order per-
mitting the payment of filing fees in installments. The failure to delete
the clause in section 48c at the same time was an inadvertence, cor-
rected by the recent amendment. It is theoretically arguable that a
petitioner may nevertheless proceed in bankruptcy in forma pauperis
pursuant to section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code," but
the amendment adds to evidence of Congressional intent that such
petitions need not be entertained by the bankruptcy court.
Section 57i. This section, as it read before the amendment, in-
dicated that if a surety on an obligation of a bankrupt debtor paid
part of it, he was subrogated to that extent to the creditor's rights.
A possible reading of the statute subjected the creditor in such a case
to a duty to share with the surety any dividend received from the
bankrupt estate." Under the prevailing interpretation of the sub-
division, however, the creditor has been entitled to prove his claim
undiminished by any partial payment from the surety and to receive
dividends thereon from the estate until his claim has been fully paid.
Only when and if the sum of the dividends and receipts from the surety
equals the amount of the claim is the surety entitled to receive the
balance of the dividends." If the creditor receives the balance, he holds
it in trust for the surety." The 1962 amendment codifies tliis existing
state of the law.
Section 58a(6). Until the recent amendment and since 1938 the
Bankruptcy Act has required creditors to get ten days' notice by mail
of a proposed compromise of any controversy in which either party was
tive Office of the United States Courts that only one clerk in a referee's office is to be
designated under the new authorization and that certification should be made in the
name of the referee by the clerk. 37 Ref. J. 10, 11 (1963).
34 See 2 Collier, Bankruptcy fl 51.01 (14th ed. 1961 Supp.).
33 See H.R. Rep. No. 1208, supra note 33, at 4; 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 339 (14th rev.
ed. 1961).
36 Id. at 340; MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 138-39, 312-13 (1956).
Swarts v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 117 Fed. 1, 12-13 (8th Cir. 1902).
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claiming over $1,000 or its equivalent. Prior to 1938 the notice require-
ment applied to all proposed compromises, and the manifest purpose
of the change was to mitigate the administrative burden and expense
which hindered the consummation of compromises of small contro-
versies.38
 In practice, however, the $1,000 requirement was confusing
and did not achieve its purpose of limiting the notice requirement to
controversies of consequence." The amendment vests discretion in the
court to eliminate the necessity of notice to creditors of a proposed
compromise irrespective of the amount claimed by either party, but,
unless the court so exercises its discretion, notice is required.
Section 59b. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, by its section 59b, re-
quired petitioning creditors seeking an involuntary adjudication of
their debtor to have provable claims in an aggregate amount of at
least $500. Amendatory legislation enacted in the Thirties, however,
enlarged significantly the categories of provable claims by including
therein rights of recovery in pending actions for negligence, contingent
debts and claims for anticipatory breach of contract:1 ° The draftsmen
of the Chandler Act thought that holders of such claims, however,
should not be enabled to institute involuntary bankruptcy proceedings
against their debtor. In the first place, questions on which ultimate
liability of the debtor depended might be resolved against the creditors,
and it would be anomalous to have a debtor put in bankruptcy at the
instigation of petitioners whose claims turned out not to be well
founded. In the second place, the hearing and determination of the
principal issues raised by the pleadings filed in the bankruptcy court,
e.g., whether the debtor has committed an act of this bankruptcy or
is insolvent, should not be complicated and protracted by collateral in-
quiries into the fact and extent of the debtor's liability to the petition-
ing creditors. The Chandler Act of 1938 therefore required the peti-
tioners to have claims that were fixed as to liability and liquidated as
to amount.'
Criticism of these restrictions on the eligibility of petitioning
88
 See Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1936).
39
 See H.R. Rep. No. 1208, supra note 33, at 5. Section 27 requires court approval
of the compromise of any controversy arising in the administration of the estate. The
compromise shall be upon terms deemed to be in the best interest of the estate. General
Order 28 somewhat ambiguously prescribes notice for any hearings on a proposed com-
pounding or settlement of a claim owing to the estate. Compare G.O. 33, dealing with
the requirements of an application by a receiver, trustee or debtor in possession for
authority to settle a controversy by arbitration and compromise.
40 See Collier, op. cit. supra note 35, si 63.01.
41 Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1936); Weinstein, The Bank-
ruptcy Law of 1938, 116 (1938). These authoritative sources for discovering the intent
behind the Chandler Act refer only to the second consideration mentioned in the text.
The first is recognized in Morgan, Section 59b of the Chandler Act: An Impediment to
Involuntary Proceedings, 37 Ill. L. Rev. 215, 219 (1942), 17 Ref. 3. 89, 90 (1943).
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creditors soon appeared." It was suggested that the Chandler Act
provision afforded an unscrupulous debtor a means for frustrating
almost any involuntary bankruptcy petition lodged against him by the
simple expedient of his denying liability to any or all of the petitioning
creditors or disputing the amounts of their claims.' Section 59b was
accordingly amended by the Omnibus Act of 1952 to substitute for
the positive requirement that the liability to each of the petitioners be
fixed, the less rigorous and negatively phrased qualification that the
claims be "not contingent as to liability!" 44
 The reason given for this
change was that the language of the Chandler Act was susceptible of
a construction which would require every petitioner to have a claim
founded on a fixed liability of the kind specified in section 63a(1),
namely, one "evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing,
absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition.''' Since such
a construction would have been unduly restrictive, the implication was
removed by eliminating the reference to "fixed" liability.
This amendment still did not deal satisfactorily with the case
presented when the debtor disputed the amount of the petitioning
creditor's claim and contested his qualification as a petitioning creditor
with a liquidated claim." The change effected by the Omnibus Act of
1962 is a further step in the direction of relaxing the restrictive qualifi-
cations for petitioning creditors. It leaves the disqualification of the
contingent creditor as it is, 47
 but it eliminates any positive requirement
that a petitioning creditor's claim be liquidated. A clause has never-
theless been added to the subdivision which in effect disqualifies the
holder of an unliquidated claim under certain circumstances. The pur-
42
 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 583 (14th ed. 1941); Morgan, supra note 41.
43
 Morgan, supra note 41. Morgan referred to the unreported case of In re The
Samaritan Treatment, Inc., in which the petition was dismissed on a denial of liability to
the petitioning creditor. The liability was the subject of pending litigation, but after the
dismissal of the bankruptcy petition, the disputed claim was settled for a substantial
amount. See also note 49 infra.
Dismissal of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was sustained in In re Garrett
& Co., 134 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1943), where the debtor denied any liability to the sole
petitioner, who claimed over $500 to be due for accounting services rendered the debtor.
44 66 Stat. 425 (1932).
45
 H.R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952).
45
 IVIacLachlan, Bankruptcy § 40 (1956).
97 Thus, the holder of an unmatured note remains disqualified from joining in a
petition against an endorser, although he might have been a petitioner before the
Chandler Act. See 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 575 (14th ed. 1941). Another example of a
contingent creditor is found in In re State Realty Co., 131 F. Supp. 554 (D. Mass.
1955), involving the contingent claim of a surety against the bankrupt for reim-
bursement. Cf. In re Lawton, 119 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. W. Va. 1954), where the existence
of the debtor's liability in fraud was said to depend on the uncertain outcome of a
plenary suit, even if the measure of liability, once established, could be predicted. A
surety's liability to the creditor is not ordinarily a contingent one. In re Gibraltor
Amusements, Ltd., 187 F. Supp. 931 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 925 (1961). What additional claims are contingent but provable under
the act is a matter of some doubt. See 3 Collier, supra, at If 63,30 (1961).
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pose of the change is most easily understood by taking note of the
criticisms it was intended to meet. As Professor Moore had pointed
out,
A may have a large unliquidated, and unsecured claim and
be incapacitated to become a petitioning creditor although
there is little doubt that $500 or more is due him on his claim.
Or he may have a claim for $10,000 that is partially secured;
and it may be reasonably clear that the difference between
the $10,000 and the amount of his security is far in excess
of $500, yet the exact value of his security is not then deter-
mined and hence A's unsecured claim is . unliquidated. 49
Moreover, a respondent, by urging a small counterclaim against an
apparently liquidated claim of A for $10,000, might remove it from
the category of liquidated claims and thereby disqualify A from serv-
ing as a petitioner." Under the Chandler version of section 59b, A
could not be a qualified petitioner. The result was to accord inordinate
importance to the matter of whether a creditor's claim was liquidated
and to encourage resistance to involuntary petitions by the raising of
disputes as to the amount of petitioners' claims in responsive pleadings.
The undeniable interest in avoiding collateral inquiries at the hearing
on an involuntary petition does not warrant the imposition of an abso-
lute requirement that every petitioner's claim be liquidated. The
advantage of simplifying proceedings in order to expedite hearings on
48
 Moore, op. cit. supra note 30, at 435. It was doubtful prior to the amendment
that a secured creditor could ever qualify as a petitioning creditor without surrendering
his security, in view of the necessity of determining the value of the security to be
deducted from the face amount of the debt. In re Silver, 109 F. Supp. 200, 205 (E.D.
1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1953); In re Central EL Oil & Ref. Co., 133 F.2d
657, 660 (7th Cir. 1943) (dictum). But see In re Gibraltar Amusements, Ltd., supra
note 47, 187 F. Supp, at 935; In re Hayes, 127 F. Supp. 514 (D. Alaska 1955); In re
Mann, 117 F. Supp. 511 (D. Md. 1952).
49 An unreported case was brought to the attention of the National Bankruptcy
Conference, in which a bankrupt was resisting an involuntary petition by relying on
counterclaims against petitioning creditors. Even if the total of the counterclaims had
been deducted in full, the petitioners' claims exceeded the statutory minimum of $500.
The 1962 amendment withdraws any basis for the debtor's resistance in such a case.
Setoffs or counterclaims asserted against three of four petitioners in Harris v.
Capehart-Farnsworth Corp., 225 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1955), had been held by the district
court not to disqualify them, not to be litigable in the trial of the issues pending ad-
judication, and to be entitled only to nominal value in the determination of the issue of
solvency of the alleged bankrupt. In reversing, the court of appeals sustained the request
of the debtor to have his claims tried on the merits. The court made no reference to the
existing requirement of section 59b that petitioners' claims be liquidated, beyond observing
that "there seems to be no sound reason why a set-off or counterclaim founded upon a
contract between an alleged bankrupt and a petitioning creditor cannot be liquidated
in bankruptcy proceedings." Id. at 270. See also Schreffler v. Schreffler, 155 F.2d 221
(10th Cir. 1946). The 1962 amendment recognizes the propriety of a trial of the issues
raised by a responsive pleading asserting a set-off or counterclaim, but vests discretion
in the court to disqualify a petitioner if it cannot be determined without undue delay
whether his claim is enough, when added to the claims of other petitioners, to reach the
$500 minimum.
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involuntary petitions must be weighed against the desirability of al-
lowing creditors with undeniably valid claims to join in a bankruptcy
petition notwithstanding some uncertainty as to the precise amount
of their claims.
The objective of the Chandler amendment of section 59b can be
served by allowing the holder of any unliquidated claim that is
provable to be a petitioning creditor, unless there is doubt that the
aggregate of the claims of the petitioning creditors totals $500 or
more." If the alleged bankrupt contests that point and the court can-
not readily determine that the aggregate of the petitioners' claims will
reach the statutory minimum without unduly delaying the decision
upon the adjudication, then the creditor holding the unliquidated claim
shall be disqualified. 51 Dismissal does not necessarily follow, how-
. ever. "Creditors other than the original petitioners may at any time
enter their appearance and join in the petition!'" Section 59g does not
require notice to the creditors before dismissal for insufficiency of
qualified petitioners." In accordance with the - spirit of the Federal
so Editorial revision administered after publication of the Committee Print referred
to in note 9 supra deleted the words "or over" after $500. The result is literally to suggest
that the petitioning creditor or creditors must have unsecured claims aggregating exactly
$500. It is to be hoped that this unfortunate implication will cause no serious difficulty
to creditors and their counsel, when they consult the act for the purpose of preparing
an involuntary petition, or to the courts when the amount of the petitioner's claims is
questioned by the debtor.
51 If the court is satisfied that the provable claims of petitioning creditors aggregate
as much as $500, no individual petitioner's claim need be liquidated. Each of the required
minimum number of creditors—whether three or one—must, however, have a claim
provable in some amount which is not contingent. See further the perceptive discussion
in Herzog, Bankruptcy Law—Modern Trends, 37 Ref. J. 20, 22-23 (1963).
It is not to be assumed that the disqualification of a petitioner for the reason that
a determination of the amount of his claim would unduly delay the decision on the
adjudication renders the claim nonprovable or nonallowable, The amount of the claim
will have to be determined or at least estimated in a manner and within a time directed
by the court in order for the claim to be allowed. If liquidation or estimation of the claim
will unduly delay the administration of the estate, it is not allowable under section 57d.
Collier, op. cit. supra note 47, 57.15. To protect such a claim from being discharged,
section 63d provides that the determination that a claim cannot be allowed because of
the difficulty of liquidating or estimating its amount, renders it nonprovable. Id. 11 63.36.
The - difficulty of determining the amount of a petitioner's claim may unduly delay the
hearing on the issue of adjudication, and yet, if adjudication nevertheless eventuates,
the claim may be proved and its amount determined by the bankruptcy court without
necessarily causing undue delay of the administration of the estate. The question of
allowance comes up later, and the court then has more time and a better opportunity to
permit development of the facts underlying the dispute as to the amount of a claim.
On the other hand, the fact that a petitioning creditor's claim has been counted
for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of the petition is not conclusive of its
allowability or even its provability in the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding. 2 Collier,
Bankruptcy 113 (14th ed. 1940).
52 Bankruptcy Act 59f. The phrase "at any time" means during the pendency of
the proceeding. 3 Collier, Bankruptcy li 59.31 (14th ed. 1941).
SO As it does for dismissals upon the application of the petitioner or petitioners, for
want of prosecution, or on consent of the parties.
253
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Rules, which are to be followed in bankruptcy proceedings "as nearly
as may be, 754
 any amendment required to cure a defective petition
should be liberally allowed. 55
Section Ma(1). The first priority in the distribution of bankrupt
estates is accorded to costs and expenses of administration as defined
in section 64a(1), but, curiously, until the recent amendment, this
comprehensive expression appeared therein merely as one of several
categories of claims dealt with. In its context it arguably included only
receivers' and trustees' expenses. By the amendment the expression
has been promoted from its position as the fifth among the seven varie-
ties of claims entitled to first priority to the beginning of the clause,
where it will serve as a general description of all the claims listed in
the clause.
The change is not merely a matter of style and symmetry, how-
ever. Since 1952 the act has included a proviso creating two classes of
priorities within section 64a(1) in the event of a supersession of a pro-
ceeding under a debtor-relief chapter. The higher priority is reserved
for "the costs and expenses of administration of the ensuing bank-
ruptcy" as against the unpaid costs and expenses of administration
incurred in the superseded proceeding." The transposition of the in-
troductory words, "the costs and expenses of administration, includ-
ing," makes it clear that all the administrative costs and expenses
described in section 64a(1) and incurred in the bankruptcy proceeding
are intended to be accorded superiority of priority over the costs and
expenses of the other proceeding.
Presumably in the interest of avoiding stilted usage, the 1962
amendments eliminated the form but not the substance of the proviso
from section 64a(1) and wherever else the form had appeared in sub-
divisions and clauses of the act undergoing revision. The use of the
proviso form has long been a feature of the Bankruptcy Act, and the
1962 legislation did not achieve any substantial reduction in its usage.
The proviso has served to state an exception to or qualification of the
statement to which it is appended, and it has been commonly recog-
nized that a proviso is to be strictly construed." The awkwardness of
54
 General Order 37. The Bankruptcy Act and the General Orders prevail in case
of inconsistency with the Federal Rules, as General Order 37 recognizes.
55
 2 Collier, Bankruptcy VI 18.09, 18.18 to .21, 18.23 (14th ed. 1940) ; 3 id. 11 59.32
(1941).
56
 The Omnibus Act of 1952 incorporated this feature in section 64a(1) to assure
the trustee in the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding that the expenses he will necessarily
incur will be paid ahead of expenses accumulated in the prior proceeding. Without such
assurance, administration is likely to break down. See H.R. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1952). Except as provided in the amendment added in 1952, the items enumerated in
section 64a(1) are of equal rank and share pro rata if the estate is not sufficient to pay
all of them in full. In re Delaware Hosiery Mills, Inc., 202 F.2d 951, 953 (3d Cir. 1953).
57
 [An] exception is said to restrict the enacting clause to a particular case,
while a proviso is said to remove special cases from the general enactment and
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the form of the proviso removed from section 64a(1) is replaced by
the awkwardness of an independent sentence introduced into one of
series of so-called clauses separated by semicolons. The absence of
any indication that the sentence qualifies the rest of clause (1) is not
likely to be significant. In a long provision like section 64a ( 1) the use
of the proviso form facilitated reference to it, but that incidental con-
venience hardly affords a sufficient reason for its retention.
Language introduced into section 64a(1) just preceding the
sentence at its end is intended to overrule Guerin v. Weil, Gotshal &
Manges." There, the court disallowed claims of petitioning creditors
for reimbursement of expenses for appraisals and accounting services
incurred in supporting the petition against a contesting debtor. The
court rejected the petitioners' reliance on General Order 34, which au-
thorizes recovery by successful petitioners of "the same costs that are
allowed to a party recovering in a civil action cognizable as a case in
equity."" The amendment is responsive to the court's suggestion that
some express Congressional authorization would be necessary to war-
rant the allowance being sought.° By explicitly according priority to
"the reasonable costs and expenses incurred, or the reasonable dis-
bursements made" by petitioning creditors in a contested proceeding,
provide for them specially, and the saving clause is said to preserve from
destruction certain rights, remedies or privileges which would otherwise be
destroyed by the general enactment. These distinctions, however, certainly do
not motivate legislative draftsmen and judicial definition discloses that courts
seldom make consistent distinction in the interpretation of the three types of
limitation.
2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 4830 (3d ed. Horack 1943). See also
id. §§ 4932-34.
58 205 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1953).
59 The decision is hard to reconcile with a fair reading of General Order 34. The
opinion articulates a philosophy of restricting allowances in bankruptcy to those which
Congress has explicitly authorized in the act and implies that the General Orders must
be given a construction consistent with this view. There was only an oblique reference
in the opinion to section 2a(18), which authorizes bankruptcy courts to tax costs against
unsuccessful parties and against estates in proceedings under the act. For comments on
the case, see Nadler, Fallacies in judicial Attitudes Toward Legal Fees in Bankruptcy,
58 Corn. L.J. 305 (1953); 54 Colum. L. Rev. 125 (1954) ; 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1132 (1954).
Although section 62 appears to be generally concerned with expenses of ad-
ministering estates, its provisions are pretty much confined to authorizing reimbursement
of expenses and allowances to officers and attorneys. Since section 64a(1) is more specific
regarding reimbursement to creditors, courts have generally relied on that section in
determining questions of allowability as well as priority of expenses incurred by creditors.
See 3 Collier, Bankruptcy lig 62.04[2], 62.21, 62.23 (14th ed. rev. 1961). It seems ap-
propriate, therefore, for the amendment under consideration to be made to section
64a(1).
The American Bar Association's Committee on Bankruptcy (in its Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law) and other professional groups early went on
record favoring legislation to overcome the Guerin case. 9 Bus. Law. No. 3, p. 4 (April
1954). Chairman Kupfer of the American Bar Association's committee stated that com-
parable expenses had been frequently allowed in Chapter X proceedings under Section 241,
but no case authority was cited. Ibid.
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the statute clarifies the statutory basis for General Order 34. The
amendment also makes clear that the right to priority otherwise con-
ferred shall not be lost by virtue of an adjudication on a voluntary
petition filed by the debtor during the pendency of an involuntary
proceeding."
Section 70b. The Chandler Act prescribed a sixty-day period fol-
lowing adjudication for the trustee in which to exercise an option to
assume or reject any executory contract.62 Although the time could be
extended (or reduced) for cause shown, the sixty-day limitation was
too stringent in practice because of the number of cases in which
the trustee either did not qualify at all within that period or did so
near the expiration of the period.° While expedition of administra-
tion remains as important a consideration as ever, the premise of the
1962 amendment is that a trustee should ordinarily have at least thirty
days for reaching a sound judgment on whether to assume or reject
an executory contract. Accordingly the amendment gives him thirty
days after his qualification when that runs longer than sixty days fol-
lowing adjudication. The amendment adds a sentence which recognizes
for the first time anywhere in the act that a court may direct that a
trustee not be appointed." The entry of such an order has the effect
of approving rejection of the debtor's executory contracts.
Section 70f. The last sentence of section 70f has, since 1938,
required an auctioneer employed in any bankruptcy proceeding, if an
individual or a partnership, ... [to] be a bona-fide resident and citizen
of the judicial' district in which the property to be sold is situated, or,
if a corporation, . . . lawfully domesticated and authorized to transact
such business in the State in which said judicial district is located."°
The provision was inserted in the bill that became the Chandler Act
to protect local against outside interests, a particular instance of need
being localized in Boston." The wisdom of including such a parochial
provision in national legislation is generally doubtful." Aside from the
awkwardness of its language," it appeared to require different auc-
61
 This provision is consistent with the usual rule that adjudication on such a
voluntary petition will not prejudice the rights of the creditors under the earlier in-
voluntary petition. 3 Collier, Bankruptcy Q 59.17. (14th ed. 1941).
82 52 Stat. 880 (1938). All of section 70b was new in the Chandler Act.
63
 H.R. Rep. No. 1208, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1961).
64 Prior to the 1962 amendment, the Bankruptcy Act was apparently drafted on
the assumption that a trustee must be appointed in every case. See, e.g., §§ 7a(3) & (6),
44a, 47 & 70a. General Order 15 and Official Form No. 25, both promulgated by the
Supreme Court in 1898 (the official form being No 27 before 1939), proceed on a dif-
ferent assumption, however, and the Supreme Court seems never to have doubted their
validity. See Smalley v. Langenour, 196 U.S. 93, 97 (1905).
66 52 Stat. 882 (1938).
66 House Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-99 (1937).
67 Cf. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 350 n.11 (1956).
08 Neither a partnership nor even an individual is likely to be a citizen of any judicial
district.
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tioneers if the property of an estate is situated in different judicial
districts. Employment of different auctioneers in such a case may or
may not be in the interest of efficient administration. The amendment
eliminates any requirement for an auctioneer beyond that he be "a
duly licensed or authorized auctioneer in the place where the sale is
to be conducted.' If the law of the place has no applicable licensing
requirement, then the bankruptcy court ordering the sale is not limited
in its choice of an auctioneer.
Section 77(a). The main reason for amending section 77 was to
provide for payment of a full filing fee of $150 to the clerk for the dis-
trict court." Prior to the amendment the fee was "$100 . . . in addition
to the fees required to be collected by the clerk under other sections of
this Act.' The fees collectible under other sections of the act now
total $50," and the amendment does not change the amount payable
with a petition under section 77. 73 Since the judge performs all the
judicial functions exercisable under section 77, however, there is no
reason for requiring any part. of the filing fee to be collected and dis-
tributed by the clerk as in straight bankruptcy cases. 74
A number of other conforming changes were made in section
77(a), which had not been changed since its original enactment in
1933. Thus, references to the "federal district court" and "circuit
court of appeals" were conformed to the descriptions that have been
proper since the Judicial Code was amended in 1948. 73
Section 160. Under the Chandler Act section 160 conferred an
apparently unlimited discretion on the judge to appoint additional
69 Most states apparently have statutes requiring persons engaged in the business
of auctioneering to obtain licenses. 5 Am, Jur. Auctions § 3 (1936). Often the power to
license and regulate auctioneers is delegated to municipalities, and a license is typically
restricted in its scope to a particular city or county. 7 C.J.S. Auctions and Auctioneers
1245 (1937).
7° See H.R. Rep. No. 1208, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
71 Section 77(a) had so provided since its original enactment in 1933. 47 Stat. 1474
(1933).
"72 The filing fee in straight bankruptcy went from $45 to $50 by virtue of the
increase of the filing fee for the trustee from $5 to $10 in 1960. 74 Stat. 198 (1960), 11
U.S.C. § 76 (Supp. III, 1960).
73 It may be noted that petitioners under Chapter X are required by section 132,
as amended in 1960, to pay a filing fee of $120, i.e., $70 above the fees otherwise col-
lectible under the act. If the petition is filed in a pending bankruptcy proceeding pur-
suant to section 127, the bankruptcy court presumably retains the $50 previously
collected. If a proceeding initiated by an original petition filed pursuant to section 126
eventuates in bankruptcy, $50 of the original $120 paid as a filing fee goes to the clerk
for distribution as in any other bankruptcy case. Discrimination between section 77
petitions and those filed under Chapter X, insofar as filing fees are concerned, goes
back to the Chandler Act, when the principle was established of allowing a filing fee
paid with a bankruptcy petition to be deducted from the fee payable with a Chapter X
petition filed thereafter in the same proceeding.
71 H.R. Rep. No. 1208, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
7:0
	
Stat. 870, 895 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 43, 132 (1958).
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trustees7° or remove trustees and appoint substitute trustees in Chapter
X proceedings." The 1962 amendment includes cotrustees among the
persons who may be so appointed by the judge. 78 In any event when
the judge exercises the power of appointment under the section, he
must fix a hearing to consider objections to the retention of the trustee
so appointed. The hearing must be held within thirty days of the ap-
pointment, and at least ten days' notice of the hearing must be given
to the persons named in section 161.7° These are the same persons
entitled to notice of the hearing on the question whether a disinterested
trustee appointed pursuant to section 156 should not be retained be-
cause not qualified or not disinterested under the act. The provision
for this additional hearing was included in the Omnibus Act at the
instance of the Securities and Exchange Commission."
Section 247. This section prescribes the procedure for notice and
hearing on applications for allowances in proceedings under Chapter
X. The 1962 amendment explicitly authorizes the elimination of notice
to any class of creditors or stockholders which does not participate
under a confirmed plan.' Once a plan which excludes participation
of any such class has been confirmed, 82 the disposition of allowance
applications cannot affect the members of the class, and notice to them
is eliminated in the interest of economy and reduction of needless
7 0
 An "additional trustee," who is to be differentiated from a disinterested trustee
appointed under Chapter X, may be a director, officer or employer of the debtor. Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 156, 158. The additional trustee's function is restricted to that of operating
the business and managing the property of the debtor during the period of his appoint-
ment. 6 Collier, Bankruptcy if 8.12 (14th ed. 1947).
77 Id. g 7.10.
78
 Whether the cotrustec must be disinterested presumably depends on whether he
is appointed for purposes other than those specified in section 189. Inferentially, a co-
trustee is more than an additional trustee.
79
 They are creditors, stockholders, indenture trustees, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and any other persons designated by the judge.
80 The Commission's explanation of this proposal as originally embodied in H.R.
11587, introduced in the 85th Congress, is set out in 33 Ref. J. 18 (1959). The National'
Bankruptcy Conference and the Judicial Conference were originally reluctant to accept
the Commission's recommendation for a hearing to be routinely required after every
appointment pursuant to section 160. Sec Ann. Rep. of Procdgs. of Jud. Conf. of United
States 26 (1958) for a statement of the Judicial Conference's position. The Commission's
argument finally prevailed that removal of an objectionable trustee appointed under
this section during the course of the proceeding is more likely to occur without undue
delay if the hearing does not have to wait for some objector to take the initiative.
81 A typical case to which the new language may apply would be one involving
an insolvent corporation where no provision for stockholder participation is contained
in the confirmed plan.
82 Confirmation itself must be preceded by submission of the plan, after approval
by the judge, to all creditors and stockholders affected by it. Bankruptcy Act § 175.
After acceptance of the plan by the requisite majority of the creditors and, if the debtor
is not insolvent, by the requisite majority of the stockholders, the judge holds a hearing
for the consideration of the confirmation of the plan and of objections that have been
made to the confirmation. Bankruptcy Act § 175. Notice of the hearing goes to creditors,
stockholders and other persons specified in section 179.
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paperwork," No class is excluded from participation by a confirma-
tion order for the purpose of this provision, however, until the time
allowed for appeal from the order has expired and not even then if an
appeal is pending."
Section 265a. Special provisions applicable to the Securities and
Exchange Commission are contained in section 265. In particular sub-
division a lists orders entered and papers filed in Chapter X proceed-
ings of which copies must be transmitted to the Commission. Here-
tofore copies of orders approving plans and modifications of plans, and
copies of the plans and modifications approved, have been required
to be forwarded to the Commission. 85
 The Commission has been en-
titled to copies of Chapter X plans in advance of judicial approval only
if the scheduled indebtedness of the debtor exceeds $3,000,000. In
such a case, section 172 requires the judge to submit for Commission
examination and report any plan regarded by him as worthy of con-
sideration, but he may submit a plan to the Commission for study and
report in a case involving a lesser indebtedness.
By amended clauses (6) and (7) of section 265a the clerk, or
the referee, in the event a reference has been made, must transmit
copies of all plans, alterations and modifications, notices of all hearings
thereon and orders approving any plans, alterations and modifica-
tions. Transmission of the copy of an unapproved plan pursuant to
the amended provision does not impose any responsibility on the Com-
mission to examine and report as does submission by a judge under
section 172. Receipt of copies of plans, and of notices of hearings
thereon, before approval will, however, enable the Commission to par-
ticipate at an earlier stage in cases of under $3,000,000 indebtedness
and to make recommendations before approval of a plan has rendered
their adoption impracticable."
Section 393a(2). Section 393 of the Bankruptcy Act exempts
from the requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 securi-
ties issued as certificates of indebtedness pursuant to section 344 in a
Chapter XI proceeding, and any transaction in securities issued pur-
83
 The administrative burden imposed by the similar notice requirements of section
496 in Chapter XII does not appear comparable to that entailed by section 247. The
National Bankruptcy Conference has consistently rejected proposals to modify the
existing requirements respecting notice of the hearing on the trustee's final account, or
of applications for allowances of compensation for services rendered, in straight bank-
ruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Summary of Proceedings of Ann. Meeting of Nat. Bkrptcy.
Conf., Res. No. 4 (B61) ; Summary of Proceedings of Ann. Meeting, Res. No. 33 (1960).
The Conference's position is that creditors of a bankrupt estate are always entitled to
notice of a proposed disposition of any money in an estate, no matter how small.
84 The Judicial Conference had objected to eliminating the notice requirement as
to any class before its participation has been finally and completely foreclosed. Ann. Rep.
of Procdgs. of Jud. Conf. of United Slates 26 (1958).
85 Bankruptcy Act II 265a(6) & (7).
88 H.R. Rep. No. 1208, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, 11-12 (1961).
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suant to a Chapter XI arrangement, subject to certain limitations
spelled out in section 393. Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits
use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce to sell, to deliver
for or after sale, or to offer to sell or buy any security for which no
registration statement is in effect." The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission raised the objection that the exclusionin section 393 went too
far in purporting to cover exchanges of securities for securities, since a
Chapter XI arrangement can not deal with the rights of either secured
creditors or stockholders." The purpose of the section is served ade-
quately by confining the statutory dispensation to exchanges for claims
against the debtor and eliminating the reference to exchanges for
securities."
APPENDIX
The changes effected by Public Law 87-681, referred to in the foregoing
article as the Omnibus Act of 1962, are shown in this appendix by italiciza-
tion of new language and bracketing of deleted portions of the Act. Some
purely technical and conforming changes are omitted in this presentation.
Amended Section 2a (1)
(1) Adjudge persons bankrupt who have had their principal place of
business, resided, or had their domicile within their respective territorial
jurisdictions for the preceding six months, or for a longer portion of the pre-
ceding six months than in any other jurisdiction, or who do not have their
principal place of business, reside, or have their domicile within the United
States, but have property within their jurisdictions, [or who have been Ad-
judged bankrupts by courts of competent jurisdiction without the United
States, and have property within their jurisdictions,] or in any cases trans-
ferred to them pursuant to this Act ; .
Added Section 2a(22)
(22) Exercise, withhold, or suspend the exercise of jurisdiction, having
regard to the rights or convenience of local creditors and to all other relevant
circumstances, where a bankrupt has been adjudged bankrupt by a court of
competent jurisdiction without the United States.
Amended Section 21d
d. Certified copies of proceedings before a referee, or of papers, when
issued by the clerk, [or] referee, or an employee of the referee designated by
his order, which shall be filed in the office of the clerk, shall be admitted as
evidence with like force and effect as certified copies of the records of district
courts of the United States are now or may hereafter be admitted as evi-
dence.
87 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
88 H.R. Rep. No. 1208, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1961); 33 Ref. J. 19 (1959). The
permissible scope of a Chapter XI arrangement is spelled out in section 357 of the act.
89 Section 393 copies almost verbatim section 264 in Chapter X and section 518 in
Chapter XII. The sections in these chapters appropriately exempt exchanges of securities
for securities.
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Amended Section 48c's First Paragraph
c. Trustees. [—] The compensation of trustees for their services, pay-
able after they are rendered, shall be a fee of $10 for each estate, deposited
with the clerk at the time the petition is filed in each case, except [when a fee
is not required from a voluntary bankrupt] where installment payments may
be authorized pursuant to section 40 of this Act, and such further sum as
the court may allow, as follows:.
Amended Section 57i
Whenever a creditor whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured,
in whole or in part, by the individual undertaking of [any] a person, fails
to prove and file [such a] that claim, [such] that person may do so in the
creditor's name, and [, if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part,]
he shall be subrogated to [that extent to] the rights of the creditor, whether
the claim has been filed by the creditor or by him in the creditor's name, to
the extent that he discharges the undertaking except that in absence.of an
agreement to the contrary, he shall not be entitled to any dividend until the
amount paid to the creditor on the undertaking plus the dividends paid to
the creditor from the bankrupt estate on the claim equal the amount of the
entire claim of the creditor. Any excess received by the creditor shall be held
by him in trust for such person.
Amended Section 58a(6)
(6) the proposed compromise of [any] a controversy [in which the
amount claimed by either party in money or value exceeds $1,000] unless
the court, for cause shown, directs that notice be not sent;.
Amended Section 59b
b. Three or more creditors who have provable claims [liquidated as to
amount and] not contingent as to liability against [any] a person, [which
amount] amounting in the aggregate to $500 in excess of the value of any
securities held by them, [if any, to $500 or over] or, if all of the creditors of
[such] the person are less than twelve in number, then one or more of [such]
the creditors whose claim or claims equal [such] that amount, may file a
petition to have him adjudged a bankrupt; but the claim or claims, if un-
liquidated, shall not be counted in computing the number and the aggregate
amount of the claims of the creditors joining in the petition, if the court
determines that the claim or claims cannot be readily determined or esti-
mated to be sufficient, together with the claims of the other creditors, to
aggregate $500, without unduly delaying the decision upon the adjudication.
Amended Section 64a(1)
SEC. 64. DEBTS WHICH HAVE PRIORITY.—a. The debts to have
priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid
in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment, shall be (1) the
costs and expenses of administration, including the actual and necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition; the
fees for the referees' salary [fund] and [for the referees'] expense fund; the
filing fees paid by creditors in involuntary cases or by persons other than
the bankrupts in voluntary cases; where property of the bankrupt, trans-
ferred or concealed by him either before or after the filing of the petition,
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[shall have been] is recovered for the benefit of the estate of the bankrupt
by the efforts and at the cost and expense of one or more creditors, the rea-
sonable costs and expenses of such recovery; [the costs and expenses of
administration, including] the trustee's expenses in opposing the bankrupt's
discharge or in connection with the criminal prosecution of an offense punish-
able under chapter 9 of title 18 of the United States Code, or an offense
concerning the business or property of the bankrupt punishable under other
laws, Federal or State; the fees and mileage payable to witnesses as now or
hereafter provided by the laws of the United States, and one reasonable
attorney's fee, for the professional services actually rendered, irrespective of
the number of attorneys employed, [to the petitioning creditors in involuntary
cases and] to the bankrupt in voluntary and involuntary cases, and to the
petitioning creditors in involuntary cases, and if the court adjudges the debtor
bankrupt over the debtor's objection or pursuant to a voluntary petition filed
by the debtor during the pendency of an involuntary proceeding, for the
reasonable costs and expenses incurred, or the reasonable disbursements
made, by them, including but not limited to compensation of accountants
and appraisers employed by them, in such amount as the court may allow
[:]. [Provided, however,* That where] Where an order is entered in a
proceeding under any chapter of this Act directing that bankruptcy be
proceeded with, the costs and expenses of administration incurred in the
ensuing bankruptcy proceeding shall have priority in advance of payment
of the unpaid costs and expenses of administration, including the allowances
provided for in such chapter, incurred in the superseded proceeding and in
the suspended bankruptcy proceeding, if any;
Amended Section 70b
b. [Within sixty days after the adjudication, the] The trustee shall
assume or reject [any] an executory contract, including an unexpired lease[s]
of real property, within sixty days after the adjudication or within thirty days
after the qualification of the trustee, whichever is later, but [Provided,**
That] the court may for cause shown extend or reduce [such period of] the
time. Any such contract or lease not assumed or rejected within [such] that
time [, whether or not a trustee has been appointed or has qualified,] shall
be deemed to be rejected. I f a trustee is not appointed, any such contract or
lease shall be deemed to be rejected within thirty days after the date of the
order directing that a trustee be not appointed. A trustee shall file, within
sixty days after adjudication or within thirty days after he has qualified,
whichever is later, unless the court for cause shown extends or reduces the
time, a statement under oath showing which, if any, of the contracts of the
bankrupt are executory in whole or in part, including unexpired leases of real
property, and which, if any, have been rejected by the trustee [:]. [Provided,
however,** That the court may for cause shown extend or reduce such period
of time.] Unless a lease of real property [shall] expressly otherwise provides,
a rejection of [such] the lease or of any covenant therein by the trustee of
the lessor [shall] does not deprive the lessee of his estate. A general covenant
or condition in a lease that it shall not be assigned shall not be construed
to prevent the trustee from assuming the same at his election and subse-
* The two preceding words were italicized as they appeared in the statute before
amendment.
** The deleted words, "Provided" and "Provided, however," were italicized as they
appeared in the statute before amendment.
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quently assigning the same; but an express covenant that an assignment by
operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or of either
party shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to terminate
the same [shall be] is enforceable. A trustee who elects to assume a contract
or lease of the bankrupt and who subsequently, with the approval of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court may fix after hearing
upon notice to the other party to the contract or lease, assigns such contract
or lease to a third person, [shall] is not [be] liable for breaches occurring
after [such] the assignment.
Amended Section 70f
f. The court shall appoint a competent and disinterested appraiser
and upon cause shown may appoint additional appraisers, who shall appraise
all the items of real and personal property belonging to the bankrupt estate
and who shall prepare and file with the court their report thereof. Real and
personal property shall, when practicable, be sold subject to the approval
of the court. It shall not be sold otherwise than subject to the approval of
the court fOr less than 75 per centum of its appraised value. Whenever [any]
a sale of real or personal property of [any] a bankrupt is made by or through
[any] an auctioneer employed by the court, receiver, or trustee, [such] the
auctioneer [, if an individual or a partnership, shall be a bona fide resident
and citizen of the judicial district in which the property to be sold is situated,
or, if a corporation, shall be lawfully domesticated and authorized to transact
such business in the State in which said judicial district is located] must be
a duly licensed or authorized auctioneer in the place where the sale is to be
conducted.
Amended Section 77(a)
(a) Any railroad corporation may file a petition stating that it is in-
solvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature and that it desires to effect
a plan of reorganization. The petition shall be filed with the court in whose
territorial jurisdiction [such] the corporation, during the preceding six
months or the greater portion thereof, has had its principal executive or
operating office, and a copy of the petition shall at the same time be filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission (hereinafter called the 'Commission')
[:]. [Provided,* That when] When any railroad, although engaged in inter-
state commerce, lies wholly within one State, [such] the proceedings shall be
brought in the [Federal] United States district court [of] for the district in
which its principal operating office [in such State] has been located during
the preceding six months or the greater portion thereof [has been located].
The petition shall be accompanied by payment to the clerk of a filing lee
of [$100,] $150 [which shall be in addition to the fees required to be col-
lected by the clerk under other sections of this Act]. Upon the filing of such
a petition, the judge shall enter an order either approving it as properly filed
under this section, if satisfied that [such petition] it complies with this sec-
tion and has been filed in good faith, or dismissing it, if he is not so satisfied.
If the petition is so approved, the court in which [such] the order is entered
shall, during the pendency of the proceedings under this section and for the
purposes thereof, have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
wherever located, and shall have and may exercise in addition to the powers
conferred by this section all the powers, not inconsistent with this section,
* The word "Provided" was italicized as it appeared in the statute before amend-
ment.
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which a [Federal] court of the United States would have had if it had ap-
pointed a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor for any purpose.
Process of the court shall extend to and be valid when served in any judicial
district. The Supreme Court of the United States shall promulgate rules re-
lating to the service of process outside of the district in which the proceeding
is pending, and any other rules which it may deem advisable in order to aid
district courts and [circuit] courts of appeal in exercising the jurisdiction
herein conferred upon them. The railroad corporation shall be referred to in
the proceedings as a 'debtor.' Any railroad corporation the majority of the
capital stock of which having power to vote for the election of directors is
owned, either directly or indirectly through an intervening medium, by any
railroad corporation filing a petition as a debtor may file, with the court in
which such other debtor has filed such a petition, and in the same proceeding,
a petition, a copy of which shall also be filed at the same time with the Com-
mission, stating that it is insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they
mature, and that it desires to effect a reorganization in connection with, or
as a part of the plan of reorganization of [such] the other debtor; and upon
the filing of [such] the petition, the judge shall enter an order either approv-
ing it as properly filed under this section, if satisfied that [such petition] it
complies with this section and has been filed in good faith, or dismissing it
if not so satisfied, and thereupon [such] the court, if it approves [such] the
petition, shall have the same jurisdiction with respect to such debtor, its
property and its creditors and stockholders, as the court has with respect to
[such] the other debtor. Creditors of any railroad corporation, having claims
aggregating not less than 5 per centum of all the indebtedness of [such] the
corporation as shown in the latest annual report which it has filed with the
Commission at the time when the petition is filed, may, if [such] the corpora-
tion has not filed a petition under this section, file with the court in which
[such] the corporation might file a petition under this section, a petition
stating that [such] the corporation is insolvent or unable to meet its debts
as they mature and that [such] the creditors have claims aggregating not
less than 5 per centum of all such indebtedness of [such] the corporation
and propose that it shall effect a reorganization; copies of [such] the petition
shall be filed at the same time with the Commission and served upon [such]
the corporation. [Such] The corporation shall, within ten days after such
service, answer [such] the petition. If [such] the answer [shall] admits the
jurisdiction of the court and the material allegations of the petition, the
judge shall enter an order approving the petition as properly filed if satisfied
that it complies with this section and has been filed in good faith, or dismiss-
ing it, if not so satisfied. If [such] the answer [shall deny] denies either the
jurisdiction of the court or any material allegation of the petition, the judge
shall summarily determine the issues presented by the pleadings without
the intervention of a jury, and if he [shall] finds that the material allegations
are sustained by the proofs and that the petition complies with this section
and has been filed in good faith, the judge shall enter an order approving
the petition; otherwise, he shall dismiss the petition. If [any] such a peti-
tion [shall be] is so approved, the proceedings thereon shall continue with
like effect as if the railroad corporation had itself filed a petition under this
section. [In case any] If a petition [shall be] is dismissed, neither the peti-
tion nor the answer of a debtor [shall] constitute an act of bankruptcy or an
admission of insolvency or of inability to meet maturing obligations or be
admissible in evidence, without the debtor's consent, in any proceedings then
or thereafter pending or commenced under this Act or in any State or
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[Federal] United States court. If, in any case in which the issues have not
already been tried under the provisions of this subdivision, any of the
creditors, [shall,] prior to the hearing provided for in paragraph (1) of sub-
section (c) of this section, appear and controvert the facts alleged in the
petition, the judge shall determine, as soon as may be, the issues presented
by the pleadings, without the intervention of a jury, and, unless the material
allegations of the petition are sustained by the proofs, shall dismiss the
petition.
Amended Section 160
SEC. 160. In any case, the judge at any time, without or upon cause
shown, may appoint additional trustees and cotrustees, or remove trustees and
appoint substitute trustees; and upon each such appointment the judge shall
fix a hearing to be held within thirty days to consider objections to the reten-
tion in office of the trustee. At least ten day? notice of the hearing shall be
given to the persons designated in section 161 of this Act.
Amended Section 297
SEC. 247. The judge shall fix a time of hearing for the consideration
of applications for allowances, of which bearing notice shall be given to the
applicants, the trustee, the debtor, the creditors, stockholders, indenture
trustees, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and such other persons
as the judge may designate, except that notice need not be given to any class
of creditors or stockholders which does not participate under the plan as con-
firmed by the court from which no appeal is pending and the time allowed
for appeal has expired. [, in] In the case of allowances for services and
reimbursement in a superseded bankruptcy proceeding, notice need be given
only to the applicants, the debtor, the trustee, and the unsecured creditors,
and may be given to such other classes of creditors or other persons as the
judge may designate. In the case of the dismissal of a proceeding under this
chapter and the entry of an order therein directing that bankruptcy be pro-
ceeded with, notice of the hearing to consider allowances need not be given
to stockholders.
Amended Section 265a(6) & (7)
(6) [the orders approving any plan or plans, together with copies of
such plans] copies of plans, alterations or modifications in plans, and any
notices of hearings on the plans, alterations, or modifications;
(7) the orders approving [alterations or modifications in plans, to-
gether with copies of such alterations or modifications] any plan or plans or
alterations or modifications in plans;.
Amended Section 393a(2)
(2) any transaction in any security issued pursuant to an arrangement
in exchange for [securities of or] claims against the debtor or partly in [such]
exchange and partly for cash and/or property, or issued upon exercise of
any right to subscribe or conversion privilege so issued, except [(a)] (A)
transactions by an issuer or an underwriter in connection with a distribution
otherwise than pursuant to the arrangement, and [ (b)] (B) transactions
by a dealer as to securities constituting the whole or a part of an unsold
allotment to or subscription by [such] the dealer as a participant in a
distribution of such securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter
otherwise than pursuant to the arrangement.
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